We analyze one of the most important phenomena of emerging B2B markets, their impact in promoting changes in contracting for the same goodstraded on the B2B exchange. This trend is especially important in capital-intensive industries, where improvements in ne-tuning the coordination of supply and demand carry large economic bene ts. The spot market information conveyed through B2B transactions has become the basis in many of these markets for de ning options, terms of trade and contracting terms for long-term contracts that are benchmarked on the shortrun B2B transactions. This paper notes a broad set of goods and services currently being traded in both B2B short-run markets and longer-term contract markets, and reviews the economic and managerial frameworks that have been proposed to explain the structure of these markets and interdependent contracts. We provide several examples to illustrate the theoretical underpinnings, which derive from contract theory, auction theory and options theory. We then provide a framework based on transactions cost economics, codi ability in B2B exchanges and short-run and long-run competition to shed light on the nature of B2B exchanges in capital-intensive industries and their integration with contracting innovations that are being engendered by these exchanges.
Introduction
Arguably the central problem in OR MS addressed by e-Business is better coordination of supply and demand, including price discovery and reduction of transactions costs of buyerseller interactions. 1 In capital-intensive industries like chemicals and steel, which are the 1 An interesting recent study of transactions costs in B2B markets, Garicano and Kaplan 2001 , suggests that the transactions costs savings alone from B2B exchanges can be a signi cant portion of the total cost of production and order ful llment. Their analysis suggest that these cost savings arise from both process improvements internal to both buyers and sellers as well as from the marketplace transaction itself.
focus of this paper, the out-of-pocket costs of excess capacity and the opportunity costs of underutilized capacity have been important factors driving the growth of exchanges for improving demand and supply coordination through e-Business platforms. The emerging reality of such exchanges is, however, quite complex in terms of product range, protocols for joining the exchange, rules for operations and settlement and so forth. One of the most interesting aspects of this evolution for OR MS is the parallel development of longterm and short-term markets for capacity and output, accompanied by a range of exotic options and forwards as the basic mechanisms supporting transactions. This has been a fascinating topic for OR MS research because it builds on the powerful framework of real options, while connecting directly to key operations decisions capacity planning, sta ng, maintenance, and so forth of the plants and technologies whose output is the focus of contracts. 2 From a practitioner's point of view, the integrated use of these Internet-based contracting mechanisms, as facilitated by the new exchanges, represents an opportunity for further improving supply chain performance and capital asset productivity.
B2B exchanges and Internet contracting have been widely proclaimed as the key mechanisms for e-Business, with trading volume of B2B exchanges estimated to exceed four trillion dollars by the year 2004 Coleman, Barrett and Austrian 2000; Geo rion and Krishnan 2001; Mendelson and Tunca 2001 . A central feature of B2B is that, especially for capital-intensive industries like chemicals, steel and electric power, contracting needs to take place well in advance of actual delivery. Failure to do so for a non-scalable technology is a recipe for last-minute confusion and huge excess costs. This has given rise to a general recognition that most of a plant's output in such industries should be contracted for well in advance. However, there is still a very important role for short-term ne tuning of capacity and output to contract for, say, the last 10 of a plant's output or a customer's requirements. Doing so requires a conceptual framework, congenial to e-Business, that allows contracting to take place at various points of time, constrained by various commitment and delivery options and exibilities, and mediated by electronic markets where these are feasible. Sustainable and pro table operations are grounded on both individually rational contracting behavior as well as viability in competitive equilibrium.
Supply chain contracting has been a very active research area in the past decade. The excellent survey volume Tayur, Ganeshan and Magazine 1999, as updated by Cachon 2001 , conveys the main focal points of activity in this area. The essential focus of this research has been on integrating operations decisions, such as ordering and return policies, with basic technology choice and pricing rules. From an e-Business perspective, what has been missing from this earlier research has been the essential element of competition, both on the pricing side as well as in the integration of competitive sourcing and contracting with risk management. The e ects of competition are profound, as we note in some detail in the results that follow.
In the B2B area of interest here, the following issues have attracted some attention in the literature and in practice:
1. Establishing and governing long-term relationships between agents in supply chains 5. Integrating contracting and market structure with operational decisions capacity, technology choice, production for pro table coordination and risk management Cohen  and Agrarwal 1999; Mendelson and Tunca, 2001; Wu, Kleindorfer and Zhang, 2001, 2002. In this paper, we plan to focus on 5 above, as the exploration of issues 1-4 is being addressed in other papers in this special issue. The problem we address presumes that relationships and exchanges have been established, together with appropriate price discovery mechanisms. The central problem we address is the e cient i n tegration of contracting and exchange-based procurement in B2B markets.
Examples of the problems considered abound. Some typical examples of the problem examined in this paper include chemicals, semiconductors and electric power. For example, in the electric power industry, as discussed in Clewlow and Strickland 2000, the deregulation of the sector has led to an explosion of activity by nancial and energy intermediaries, o ering both futures and options products see for example, the web site of www.apx.com. These exist through the New York Mercantile Exchange in the U.S. and through other exchanges throughout Europe, Latin America and Asia. The information being generated from these long-term and short-term contract exchanges is further giving rise to a new range of risk hedging instruments, such as the weather derivatives recently introduced in the electric power industry Mount 2002. These products provide various rights and obligations to buyers and sellers for the purchase of energy delivered at speci c places and at speci c times. These products are clearly substitutes for equivalent deliveries in the associated spot markets.
In the semiconductor industry, as discussed in Brown and Lee 1998, normally semiconductor output is done to speci cations. But certain semiconductor foundaries allow for a general programmable semiconductor to be manufactured. The speci c character of the semiconductor is then only determined ex post, after logic programming has been completed. This, in e ect, allows postponement of the nal design of the semiconductor until market demand is known. For this type of semiconductor manufacturing, a lively spot market and contract market, with options, exists to trade the general purpose capacity of the foundaries involved. Buyers purchase options on capacity in advance of knowing their speci c market demand. Foundaries then respond to the particular needs of buyers as these capacity options are called on the day. Competing with these options are spot markets for the same general purpose capacity, where these spot markets balance residual supply and demand on the day.
Commodity chemicals or plastics and other types of capital-intensive goods are further applications areas for such contracting innovations, and signi cant exchanges already exist for these commodities, e.g., Commerxplasticsnet.com, Newview.com e-Steel.com, PaperExchange.com and others with global reach. The resulting market structure has stimulated an explosive growth in nancial and contractual innovations. Foremost among these is the development of bilateral contracts, both long-and short-term, in the form of forwards, options, and related speculative instruments, and with intermediaries and brokers entering the market to further stimulate the use of the volume of trade on these exchanges. Contracting serves in these markets both the important role of price discovery as well as the obvious direct role of coordinating capacity commitments with anticipated demand. Such bilateral contracts take many forms, but basically they commit a Seller to reserve a certain amount of capacity or output e.g., 100 tons of sulfuric acid capacity, with output and delivery callable during a speci c period e.g., each w eekday during the month of October, 2002 for a particular Buyer's use. On the day, Sellers and Buyers can also sell excess capacity o r b u y additional non-contract output in an associated backup market, which we refer to as the spot market for the good. The type of bilateral contract used in practice has a two-part contract fee structure. The rst part is a reservation cost perunit of capacity, and the second, an execution cost perunit of output when this capacity is actually used in the example noted, these would be levied per ton delivered. This paper reviews the relevant literature, explores the challenges in implementing these types of interconnected contracting and spot market strategies, and points to the most important open research questions that surround this area of e-Business. In particular, we review recent innovative methodological applications from real options theory and nancial engineering in this domain and build on our own theoretical framework that integrates various methodologies, as developed in Wu, Kleindorfer and Zhang 2001, 2002, Wu, Kleindorfer and Sun 2001, hereafter referred to as the WKZ papers. All of this work is primarily focused on capital-intensive industries in which the economic bene ts of coordinating capacity with demand are evidently large. In addition to this work, primarily focused on the structure of the competitive B2B exchanges to support such coordination, capacity options have n umerous other important applications, including foremost their use in designing e ective risk management strategies for strategic partnerships and long-term contracting. This application is reviewed in detail in the companion paper in this special issue by Grey, Olavson and Shi 2002. OR methods for modeling and solving supply chain management problems, including those associated with options and capacity planning under uncertainty, are clearly an important further element of interest in this general area see Swaminathan and Tayur 2002 in this special issue.
The rest of the paper is organized as the follows. Section 2 begins with a survey and constructive critique of key related contributions in the literature. Section 3 follows with an overview of general results. Section 4 provides a brief survey of state-of-the-art" industry practice and highlights open questions and directions for future research.
Overview and Literature Review
As a prelude to our review of speci c theoretical contributions and applications, let us consider the most important elements of the problem of interest here see Figure 1 . The model developed adopts the following perspective. One or more buyers face a decision as to how to source an intermediate product from one or more suppliers. They can do so either by setting up longer-term contracts, with specialized suppliers, or through one-time spot purchases from generalized suppliers. In the case of contracts, systems and procedures are established ahead of time to support the execution of transactions, and these procedures may beembodied in an exchange with restricted membership. In the case of generalized suppliers, procurement occurs through a spot exchange", where the exchange can be either an established electronic exchange or something as simple as the Yellow Pages. The key di erence between these types of procurement is that contract procurement is negotiated in advance, and can accommodate virtually any customization in product or delivery features desired by the buyers, while generalized or spot" procurement is constrained by the rules of the market, and typically allows much less customization 3 . The underlying choice of contract versus spot procurment involves both cost and time tradeo s. We assume that contracting requires time, and leads to xed costs to establish the buyer-seller systems and procedures that underlie contract execution. The bene ts of contracting are assumed to belower variable production and transactions costs, including the costs of poor quality and o -spec product, and a higher probability of order ful llment in the face of demand volatility. Spot purchases from generalized suppliers, and perhaps ful lled using generalized logistics providers, provide access to a broader competitive market, and allow ne tuning of demand and supply, but possibly at higher unit costs associated with the poorer matching of product speci cations and delivery features with the buyer's requirements. While these bene ts favor contracting, contracting must bedone in advance, and sometimes well in advance, of physical delivery requirements so that investments in capacity or in customization required of suppliers to support contract execution may face increased uncertainty relative to spot market transactions. The tradeo between these costs and risks depends fundamentally on the codi ability of transactions and the volatility o f demand, where codi ability means the ability t o specify product, delivery and settlement requirements electronically in a veri able manner see Zander and Kogut 1995; and Levi, Kleindorfer and Wu 2001 . If transactions are completely codiable, and unit costs are identical between these two sourcing alternatives, there would be no reason for either competing suppliers or buyers to set up long-term contracts. But cost di erences can arise for both suppliers and buyers. On the supplier side, as Helper and Sako 1995 and Seidmann and Wang 1995 point out, shared schedules and EDI links can signi cantly reduce supplier costs by promoting better production planning through more precise requirement and delivery schedules. On the buyer side, the advantages of contract procurement and strategic partnerships with suppliers have been widely recognized e.g., Helper and Sako, 1995. To summarize, procurement management has gone through several waves of change in the past few decades. The end result is that improvements in IT and in supply chain management practices have encouraged two basic trends. In procurement relations supported by contracts, we h a ve seen develop inter-organizational systems and procedures to improve the integration of buyers and sellers and to coordinate their capacity planning, production and logistics operations. In procurement relations supported by arms-length market sourcing, we have seen the emergence of various types of e-procurement, from companydriven portals to B2B exchanges. In this latter area, developments in business networking Osterle, Fleisch and Alt 2000 and Enterprise Resource Planning ERP have been the primary enables linking market-generated requirements seamlessly with supply chain management, enterprise planning and ful llment systems Hitt, Wu and Zhou 2002. There have been several major impacts from these joint developments, including leaner supply chains, increased outsourcing, increased customization of product and delivery options to nal customers, and much improved systems to measure and understand pro tability. This paper is concerned with those procurement transactions that have enjoyed the bene ts of both of major waves of change, i.e. of both the improvements in contract procurement and in arms-length market sourcing. Such transactions have undergone su cient standardization to allow both contract procurement and spot markets to be used, as typied by the commodity examples mentioned earlier of plastics, chemicals and electric power. The possibility that both markets can be used has given rise to a wave of innovation in the instruments and procedures that will support the evaluation of the right mix of these two sources.
The theoretical framework necessary to analyze this question will be laid out in the next section. For the moment, we simply note that this framework has general origins in the transactions cost framework of Coase 1937 and Williamson 1985 , and in the economic analysis of options and forwards. Let us brie y analyze these foundational elements of this literature. The key focus in contracting in economics has been driven by the transactions cost framework developed by Coase 1937, Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978, and Williamson 1985. The basic hypothesis of this approach is that transactions with one or more buyers will be structured so as to minimize the total production and transactions cost of these transactions, including contracting and monitoring costs. One of the key elements of B2B markets is arguably the reduction in transactions cost associated with automating transactions and providing appropriate IT platforms to support these. 4 Extensions to this work, e.g., Farrell and Shapiro 1989, have considered the lock-in e ects associated with switching costs and the impact that such costs can have on contract length and the incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior by one or other of the contracting parties. These problems are usually modeled in a context in which relationship-speci c investments are required for e cient contracting, and such investments become the subject of hold-up behavior i.e., opportunism after they are made. Clearly, a well-speci ed contract with veri able information can beanimportant element in reducing these incentives.
Of course, the basic control for opportunism is competition, and the move t o wards B2B exchanges has been stimulated in part by the fundamental objective of promoting either decreased transactions cost or increased competition depending on who is attempting to initiate the B2B exchange. In the area of options, forwards and futures contracting, a considerable literature exists in the nance and economics literature. This literature has dealt with pricing, with market structure and with e ciency issues, typically in the area of commodities where standard contracts are easily de ned and where there is a long history of the use of forwards and options trading.
The best known results in the nancial economics area are those due to Black and Scholes 1973 and Merton 1973 , 1990 This paper builds on the basic structure of these results, and especially their connection to competitive markets, but focuses much more on the nature of technology, capacity and operational decisions than the traditional nancial economics literature. Indeed, as noted above, our problem in a nutshell is to characterize the consequences for technology, capacity and contracting choices when alternative sources of supply compete with one another in satisfying a set of buyer demands. The alternative sources of supply considered here are both options and forward contracts, as well as spot purchases. The key di erence between our approach and the standard options pricing approach of the nance literature is that di erent suppliers may have di erent costs and capacity conditions. These operational issues are typically ignored in the nancial economics literature but, as we note in more detail below, they are central to determining the outcome of pricing and contracting in B2B markets.
Some important results from the nancial economics literature deserve mention as precursors and contrasting benchmarks for the applications of interest here. Allaz 1992 and Allaz and Vila 1993 examine the e ciency of forward transactions in an oligopoly setting. While these papers assume homogeneous producers and instantaneous scalability no capacity limitations on the day, they have provided an important benchmark in the economics literature on the factors than can in uence the e ciency of forward markets. Indeed, Allaz and Vila 1993 show that the existence of B2B markets can be ine cient because of strategic use of these markets by suppliers with market power. These results have been extended and generalized by Kamat and Oren 2002 and Mendelson and Tunca 2001, reviewed in more detail below. Interestingly, we nd that these results do not generalize in the richer framework we model in which capacity choices are made prior to contracting and spot purchases. The general setup of these results foresees the possibility that a given manufacturer can procure capacity or input from several sources, including contracting and spot procurements. Excess demand may be lost, possibly with additional penalties, and excess supply may besold in the spot market in a salvage market". In a single supplier-single buyer framework, these papers analyze many di erent contract forms e.g., price-determined, exible quantity commitments, minimum take, returns policies, etc.. A basic review of these results can befound in Cachon 2001. The basic limitation of these results is that they do not confront the essential element of competition that B2B exchanges embody. Recent results surveyed in the next section remedy this shortcoming and allow the analysis of markets in which a numberof participants can trade as in liquid B2B markets. Such markets imply more standardized and simpler contracts, with prices and contract terms then determined competitively rather than through a negotiations framework as in the more traditional supply chain management literature. The earlier models of supply chain management in the OR MS literature should beviewed, however, as complements to the work considered here, where these complements are most applicable to illiquid, idiosyncratic markets in which long-term strategic relationships tend to emerge between single buyers and one or a small numberof suppliers.
The Analytical Framework
Let us consider an analytical framework capturing the basic elements of the above discussion. Figure 1 depicts the timeline for trading in the B2B exchange. Before the fact, at t 0 , capacity and technology choices are made by sellers. As we will see, these choices will bedi erent when rational operations managers know that they can netune demand and supply through the B2B exchange than when such an exchange does not exist. At t 1 , with updated information on the distribution of spot prices, sellers and buyers contract with one another, using options and forwards, for delivery of some intermediate good at t 2 . Finally, a t t 2 , after possibly additional information updating, options are called, deliveries are made and additional sales and purchases are made in the short-term spot or cash market. Between t 1 and t 2 , there may be additional trading of options and additional, possibly continuous, updating of information on spot prices. In this paper, to keep matters simple, we will assume a discrete-time framework with no secondary trading. Thus, we will only be concerned with the indicated decision instants t 0 ; t 1 and t 2 .
Insert Figure 1 About Here
Overview of WKZ results and extensions
The WKZ series of papers integrates strategic capacity and operations decisions with EMarket design, issues that have been treated only in isolation in the literature reviewed above. In particular, the results in WKZ provide a benchmark for pricing capacity options under both monopoly and competitive conditions.
We assume a set of I Sellers, denoted , and any n umber of Buyers. We use the following notation. We will suppress the dependence of the sets M j k on s; g below.
We make standard economic assumptions on the Willingness-to-Pay Demand function essentially that demand is downward sloping. We also make t wo other regularity assump- This implies that Buyers will not contract for more than what they are sure they will use if they buy under contract on the day, i.e., if Q i 0 then the sum of all contracted capacity with execution fees less than or equal to g i must not exceed D s g i . 8 Under this rule, when there is a bid-tie among Sellers, then the Buyers' demand for Seller i's output is proportionally allocated in the exchange to the Sellers according to their bid capacity, t h us Q i = Dp Li XM .
determined by the following: When there are multiple Sellers, we a n ticipate that they all have complete knowledge of Buyer demand functions, as would be a reasonable approximation when buyers and sellers deal with one another frequently through an exchange. Because of this fore-knowledge assumption, and its use in the Sellers' optimal bidding strategy, we refer to the resulting equilibrium as a von Stackelberg Equilibrium". The reader will note, however, that the equilibrium is characterized by a Bertrand-Nash, non-cooperative response whereby every Seller adjusts its contract bid, according to the index noted in Theorem 1, to beas high as possible, given other Seller's bids. The following Theorem is the key result on structure and existence of equilibrium. Condition C1, noted as the symmetry condition", says that in the short-term equilibrium, for any Seller in the money", i.e., for any k 2 M, its entire capacity will be contracted in the contract market. Condition C2 is a standard regularity assumption on the demand function D to assure quasi-concavity of the pro t function in prices. Condition C3 implies that any Seller out of the money" does not have any incentive to join in the short-term contract market equilibrium, as doing so results a net loss in its pro t.
If any of the above conditions is violated, then no equilibrium is the outcome. This appears to be the case frequently enough in some capital-intensive markets, as discussed and illustrated in Bunn and Day 2001. In the event where an equilibrium does not exist, the model suggests short-run cycling" behavior as the result of Bertrand-Nash adjustment, which is frequently observed in practice in industries with scale economies. Some examples below will provide further insights on equilibrium existence. The above results characterize short-run behavior, where capacity is xed. The following theorem summarizes the consequences for long-run behavior and market structure resulting from rational capacity and technology choices when Buyers and Sellers expect to trade in B2B exchanges of the sort described here.
Theorem 4: Long-term market segmentation WKS 2001. Assume a long-term equilibrium K ; p ; M exists. The market segmentation of Sellers in the long-run is the following. i For any Seller k in the money", then s k k , i.e., 8k 2 M , k participates in both the contract and the spot market. ii For any Seller k out of the money", i.e., 8k 2 n M , the necessary and su cient condition for k to participate in the spot market is s k k . iii For any Seller k 2 n M but s k k ; k will be out of business" in the long-run.
The above Theorem 4 says that if the long-term market equilibrium exits, it must be unique, and furthermore, it is separable in the following sense. First, assume that the c-index s i + Gb i of Sellers is ordered as: c 1 c 2 : : : c I . Then, Theorem 4 implies that there is unique group of Sellers, with c 1 ; : : : ; c h who participate in both the contract and spot markets, a further disjoint and unique group of Sellers, with c h+1 ; : : : ; c s , who only participate in the spot market, and, lastly, a remaining group of Sellers, with c s+1 ; : : : ; c I , who will be out of business" in the long-run.
Unsurprisingly, the nature of the spot market volatility and price level as well as both variable and capital costs and the access parameter m are factors a ecting which technologies survive in the long run. The above results provide the key insights on how these cost and market factors interact strategically to determine which markets will exist in the long run and which Sellers will be able to survive in each respective market. Our results capture the interaction of competing technologies with alternative market structures, which accommodate both the extent of competition in terms of the number of suppliers as well as the relative cost and access advantages of alternative suppliers. Other results in the literature either ignore supplier heterogeneity e.g., Allaz and Vila 1993 or competition among suppliers e.g. Gardner and Rogers, 1999 .
The WKZ framework is easily extended to the multi-Buyer case, simply by ranking Buyers in order of their willingness-to-pay WTP, and assuming that Seller capacity at equilibrium is allocated in order of decreasing WTP i.e., moving down the demand curve. This aggregation is without loss of generality here because we assume that both Buyers and Sellers are risk neutral, as is appropriate for business activity.
The above framework has been extended in a numberofways, which w e brie y summarize here. First, Spinler, Huchzermeier and Kleindorfer 2000 generalized the single-Seller results of WKZ 2002 to the state-dependent case, whereby the WTP functions charac-terizing demand for Buyers could themselves depend on the state of the world e.g., both demand and spot price might depend on temperature. A related interesting question is whether generalizations to allow for state-dependent options contracts would perform better than the simpler contracts studied here. Such contracts would take the form s; g!; Q ! where g and Q both may depends explicitly on the state of the world !. Such contracts are easily shown to bedominated by the two-part options contracts studied here when WTP is not state-dependent. But such contracts might be of interest if either Sellers' costs b depend on ! or if Buyers' demands depend on !, for example, if the strength of Buyer demands depends on the weather" Mount, 2002 .
A second generalization concerns the issue of codi ability o f the transaction, by which we mean the ease with which product, payment and delivery speci cations can be digitized in a credible fashion for trading and contracting. There is a spectrum of possibilities for codi ability. Some transactions are by their nature so customized that they cannot be codi ed at all. Others can be codi ed through negotiations, pre-screening and quali cation of suppliers, or by redesigning the product itself. Finally, some products, like commodities, can be easily codi ed. Levi, Kleindorfer and Wu 2001 examine the consequences of such di erences in codi ability for B2B exchanges. They capture these, extending the above analysis, by analyzing the consequences of three additional cost drivers: 1 the xed codi ability cost I C of installing idiosyncratic information systems and procedures to assure the ability o f Buyers and Sellers to post and execute understandable orders; 2 the unit cost di erences b s , b c , if any, between sourcing on the contract market b c versus sourcing on the spot market b s ; 3 the adaptation cost a per unit purchased on the spot market, re ecting the cost to Buyers of adapting product that might beslightly o -spec from their needs if purchased in the spot market rather than in the more orderly and less time-compressed contract market. Naturally, if custom features of a product make spot markets more expensive in the sense that either a increases or b s , b c increases, 
Illustrative numerical examples
Suppose the spot market price follows an exponential distribution, fy = Table 1 for procuring needed inputs, or alternatively can rely on the spot market. Suppose the spot price follow the exponential distribution as described above. How much of each of these additional contracts F 1 ; C 1 and C 2 should be used and how m uch should he rely on his owned asset C 0 ?
From the theory developed above, the Buyer should make the indicated purchases and, on the day, should use these in the order of increasing g. Thus, if the spot market price on the day turns out to be 20, then the Buyer's total demand is D s 20 = 14:6, and the buyer's optimal strategy is to exercise her contracts in the increasing order of g, 5 + 3 :4 + 1 :5 = 9 :9, and ful ll the residual demand 14:6 , 9:9 = 4 :7 from the spot market. Table 2 and the risk factor m = 0:5. We can compute s; c ; + Gb as shown in Table 2 . It is straightforward to compute that in the short term, four Sellers, namely 1, 2, 3, and 4 achieve an equilibrium at a price p = 26. Seller 5 is not in the short-term equilibrium even though 5 has strong incentives to participate since 5 can not make any money on the spot market due to very high short-run marginal cost Gb 5 = 30. Using the above Theorem, we can compute that there are only two survivors in the long run, namely 1 and 2, with the equilibrium price, p = 23:236. The optimal capacity investments for these two Sellers are K 1 = 4:180 and K 2 = 2:584. Seller 3 and Seller 4 nd themselves out of the contract market, and both participate only in the spot market. Seller 5 is out of business" in the long run, and is better o by shutting down all its plants. from one seller the monopolistic supplier via long-term contracting or via a B2B exchange set up by the same supplier on the spot market with the seller as the Stackelberg leader. Manufacturers use this procurement as an input and produce an output, sold to some endconsumers. The spot market price is determined endogenously rather than exogenously as in the WKZ framework where no parties have market power. The MT model gives the necessary and su cient conditions for the existence of the exchange. They analyze the impact of the exchange on the participants as a function of information quality. Among interesting ndings in the MT model is that the introduction of the exchange does not necessarily bene t the participants despite the fact that it reduces transaction prices of the seller and the buyers and serves the role of aggregating and transmitting information among participants. This is because the exchange contributes to price volatility and quantity uncertainty. As a result, consumers can be worse o with the exchange than without. The same is true of the seller and buyers. In this case, participants will eschew spot market participation in favor of contracting. On the other hand, when the exchange is highly liquid, volatility will not beampli ed by the exchange and buyers and the seller will rely completely on the exchange, even to the extent of forgoing contracting altogether. The corresponding conditions in the WKZ framework are when the seller has perfect spot market access and or when the cost of assuring codi ability i s l o w i.e., m is close to 1 and there is no penalty for spot market participation relative t o contracting. 9 Peleg, Lee and Hausman 2001 hereafter, PLH consider a problem similar to that proposed here, but with some important di erences. In their setup, there is only one Buyer who has the option to purchase from any one of several quali ed Sellers. The Buyer makes purchases from his current Seller in period 1 and inventories any excess input if period 1 demand does not exhaust the amount ordered. If demand exceeds the amount ordered, then excess demand is backlogged going into period 2. At the beginning of period 2, and prior to observing period 2 demand, the Buyer may make additional purchases for delivery on the day" under one of three arrangements. In the rst, called Strategic Partnership, the Buyer signs an agreement with his current Seller and is therewith guaranteed a xed price for input delivered in period 2. In the second, called Pure Auction, the Buyer uses an auction mechanism to determine the lowest-price bidder for his required period 2 input, where the auction is conducted after the Buyer's demand, and therefore his requirement for input, is known. In the third arrangement, called the Combined Strategy, the Buyer signs an agreement with one of the Sellers that guarantees the selected Seller a minimum purchase quantity Xmin, at the agreed price, after the Buyer's demand has been observed; and the Buyer also commits to running an auction for any additional units of input that he may need to ful ll period 2 demand. Depending on the price level o ered under Strategic Partnership and the minimum required purchase quantity Xmin under the Combined Strategy, and for an independent private values model for the Seller auction, the authors show that either of these three strategies can be optimal. It should be noted, however, that there is no particular relationship required between the price bid in the auction and the price o ered by the strategic partner in this model, in contrast to the WKZ models where sellers are mindful when they commit to forward contracts that they may as well sell their output in the spot market the auctions model of PLH. Note also that only the selected Seller currently transacting business with the Buyer in period 1 is allowed to o er a contract for period 2 deliveries in the PLH model, in contrast to the model presented here in which all Sellers compete both in the contract and in the spot market. Despite these limitations, the PLH model does show the potential bene ts of coordinating long-term and short-term markets, and this in a context in which inventory is allowed.
A related single-Buyer auction setup to PLH is contained in Chen 2001. Chen 2001 presents a framework to integrate supply chain management with auction design for a single Buyer sourcing an intermediate goodfrom multiple Sellers. Chen applies the theory of optimal auction design e.g., Myerson 1981 to determine optimal supply chain contracts the Buyer. As in the economic theory of procurement under incomplete information La ont and Tirole 1993, Chen's results require the assumption of a common knowledge distribution of Seller production costs, which limits its applicability to the case of a single Buyer who can impose his own common knowledge" assumption on the market, even if it is inaccurate. Chen uses his framework to analyze the performance of various auction designs according to the decision rights in the channel Vendor Managed Inventories, Buyer Managed Inventories, or Shared Decision Rights concerning quantities delivered, and compares this to the incomplete information optimal auction design as derived in Myerson 1981 . While such results are potentially signi cant for supply chain design and contracting, they have only limited application to B2B exchanges, where the spot market and not negotiation or a common-knowledge distribution of supplier costs plays the role of summarizing available information on price. A key open issue is the integration of Chen's optimal design results with the B2B framework studied here, which i s c haracterized by trading using standard two-part contracts.
Araman, Kleinknecht, and Akella 2001 hereafter, AKA study the economic value of B2B exchanges, again in the context with inventory. They consider a buyer who can procure from a seller either via a long-term contract, an Internet exchange spot market, or a combination of both. However, they di er with the WKZ framework signi cantly in the following respect. First, the long-term contract is a must-produce and must-use", i.e., a forward in the WKZ framework with a zero exercise fee. Further, a penalty cost is incurred if the buyer does not call the full reserved capacity with the seller on the day. Second, since they assume that acceptance of delivery is required; the spot market the exchange is only used to ful ll the residual demand after the reserved capacity has been used fully. Third, the AKA work considers only one seller and one buyer, i.e. no competition among the sellers. They show that the B2B exchange is bene cial from the buyer's perspective, that both long-term contracting and the B2B exchange are sustainable, and that a mix between these two is optimal. It would beinteresting to see if the AKA work, including inventory options, can be extended in a game-theoretic analysis i.e., market equilibrium, along the lines of the WKZ framework.
An insightful introduction to the use of options thinking for supply chain management has been made by Shi, Daniels and Grey 2001 . They analyze the use of derivative instruments in managing supply chain risks. Their framework allows for inventory and uses established options formulations to value this and other pre-commitment or reservation rules, as part of supply-chain contracting, to show that options contracts have considerable value in coordinating supply and demand and in managing risks from volatility in either of these. For example, buy-back contracts and quantity-exible contracts can be fruitfully viewed and valued as options. The manner in which market equilibrium prices are reached for such supply chain options is, however, not analyzed in Shi, Daniels and Grey 2001.
Zhu 2001 poses a modeling framework similar to WKZ and MT, but with uncertainty in the cost of Sellers, captured in a manner similar to Chen 2001 through a commonknowledge distribution function. Zhu allows both contracting and spot purchases, and analyzes in addition the incentives to join the exchange, allowing for spot purchases. When joining is costly, he nds that Sellers with low unit cost have an incentive to join the exchange while those with high unit costs do not although the latter may still contract. This is analagous to the equilibrium characterized in Theorem 4 above. This result, derived under somewhat simpler demand conditions, but under di erent conditions on the cost structure of Sellers, suggests that the result in Theorem 4 is somewhat robust to the assumptions of the modeling framework. We note, however, that Zhu does not characterize as WKZ 2001 does the possibility of non-existence of equilibrium. Such non-existence leads, as our examples above show, to cycling behavior which is observed in several B2B markets e.g., Bunn and Day 2001. In this section, we discuss how various types of contracts are implemented in emerging electronic exchanges for outputs and capacity. In doing so, we explore the challenges as seen by exchange developers and users in the e cient design of exchanges that have implemented or are attempting to implement the contract innovations described above. Recently, several classi cation schemes for B2B exchanges have been proposed. For example, Kaplan and Sawhney 2000 provides a two-way classi cation of the B2B markets places, which we illustrate in Figure 2 . In this framework, the rows are how" to procure and the columns are what" to procure. Here, Firms buyers and sellers have two means, systematic sourcing with prescreening and detailed registration and credit settlement procedures or spot sourcing, which i s i n tended to allow a m uch broader scope of participants on much shorter notice. The two classes of procured goodin this table are: maintenance, repairs and operating MRO inputs and manufacturing inputs. The four possible howwhat combinations lead to the B2B Matrix in Table 3 , where we h a ve e n tered in each cell a few of Kaplan and Sawhney's examples. A basic point made by these authors is that operating inputs tend to be low-value items that can be shipped via general logistics providers, such as UPS and FEDEX, whereas manufacturing inputs are higher valued items requiring speci c handling and logistics solutions.
While this is a useful framework for analyzing logistics requirements, our interest is more focused on the nature of the buyer-seller relationships in B2B markets. For this purpose, we follow Williamson 1985, Kogut and Zander 1992 and Levi, Kleindorfer and Wu 2001 on transactions costs and codi ability. As noted above, the rst essential ingredient for being able to transact on a B2B exchange is the digitization and standardization of the product or service to be exchanged. The second essential ingredient is the cost of screening and qualifying parties to the exchange, including the veri ed assurance that participants to the exchange have the requisite expertise and resources to trade responsibly through the exchange. These ingredients are realized for di erent goods in di erent w ays, as shown in Figure 2 . The horizontal axis measures the codi ability of the transaction, which we capture through two costs". The rst cost, a", is the unit cost of customizing product purchased in the exchange to the particular use required. The higher a" is, the less satisfactory are spot purchases on the exchange relative to contract purchases, which do not require adaptation cost. The second cost is the incremental production cost b s , b c associated with producing the goodfor spot sales versus contract sales. This incremental cost is associated with the lower cost b c of more stable contract production that allows, through advanced planning, lower cost sta ng, maintenance and other production decisions under contract procurement than the corresponding production cost b s under last-minute" production for the spot market. We think of these two cost factors as both being driven by the relative codi ability of the transaction, by which we mean the ease of de ning in digital form all relevant c haracteristics of the product and service to be sourced, including delivery and settlement conditions. Clearly, the higher these costs or the lower the level of codi ability, the more contract-intensive one would expect the corresponding transaction to be. The formal derivation of this intuitive fact is in Levi, Kleindorfer and Wu 2001.
Insert Figure 2 About Here
The vertical axis measures the cost of establishing a reliable relationship, including the veri cation of credit worthiness, expertise in health and safety requirements and any idiosyncratic investments required for participants in a B2B exchange to be able to execute legitimate transactions electronically. In the context of the model described earlier, the cost of establishing this relationship is represented again by two cost factors. The rst is the sunk investment cost I C required for idiosyncratic investments. The second is the technology and market access index c = s + Gb c which represents the opportunity cost of spot market participation relative t o c o n tract sales for a given supplier. As either of these two costs increase equivalently in the Figure, as 1=I C or 1=c decrease, the stronger the advantages of the spot market.
From Figure 2 , we identify three bands" or regions of types of transactions and associated e cient market structures. The rst region encompasses those transactions we would expect to see mediated via spot markets only. These are transactions for low-value items that require little e ort to verify product attributes, quality or credit requirements for buyers or sellers. On the other extreme are transactions that, by reason of the required customization and di culty of verifying the quali cations of buyers and sellers to transactions, can only occur after screening and quali cation of suppliers and buyers has taken place and all product and delivery requirements have been set through joint negotiations. Such transactions might use B2B exchanges, including options of the form discussed above, but then only on the basis of contractually pre-agreed product and delivery structures, and for a closed group of pre-quali ed buyers and suppliers. Depending on the codi ability o f such transactions, some limited nal adjustment of supply and demand may be possible via the exchange, but even this might be precluded for one-o , very customized requirements. For these latter transactions, the B2B exchange is more like a closed marketplace for real-time sharing of forecasts and production planning information and better ts the models of the traditional OR MS literature e.g., Tayur, Ganeshan and Magazine 1999 and Cachon 2001, than the capacity options framework developed here.
The nal region of transactions re ected in Figure 2 are those of primary interest in this paper, where some pre-quali cation of buyers and sellers, together with agreement by all exchange participants on standards for products, contracts, settlement procedures and the like, can be negotiated, possibly with signi cant costs to establish compatible platforms for trading. In such instances the standardization of the product allows spot markets to provide valuable additional matching and aggregation bene ts, while the costs of establishing relationships and the bene ts of more stable contracting on smoothing production costs lead to a signi cant portion of order ful llment being done on a contractual basis.
We h a ve e n tered some examples in each of the regions of Figure 2 or current exchanges. For example, Covisent allows prequali ed suppliers to the Big 3 manufacturers in the U.S. auto industry to facilitate order ful llment and tracking. AlphaEnergy allows the trading, for prequali ed suppliers and buyers, of a broad set of energy forwards and derivatives options. W.W. Grainger is a B2B exchange for MRO goods, primarily serving as a portal for W. W. Grainger's own products. While a more complete mapping and characterization of B2B exchanges remains to be done, we nd the above framework fairly congenial in understanding the intensity o f c o n tract versus spot purchases in many existing exchanges, including those classi ed in the Kaplan and Sawhney framework noted in Table  3 of course, Kaplan and Sawhney had a somewhat di erent objective in mind in developing their framework.
While this paper has reviewed a number of signi cant recent contributions in theory and practice to understanding the structure of B2B markets and underlying features of these, there are clearly a numberofopenchallenges confronting OR MS researchers going forward in improving the design and operation of B2B exchanges. Among them, the most pressing need is the development of governance mechanisms to protect exchange participants and shareholders and to provide appropriate screening and qualifying procedures for participation in these exchanges. What has been accomplished to date, as reviewed here, is the development of the foundations and basic parameters likely to underlie various types of exchange as characterized by the nature of the transactions involved and the costs of establishing reliable relationships for exchange participants. The many unfolding examples we have noted show that, especially for capital-intensive industries, the bene ts from such exchanges and from the growing trade in real capacity options written on these exchanges, can besubstantial. 
